1999 Amsterdam Treaty - Article 2, 15

Conventional wisdom and some of the literature on globalization, global governance, and regional organizations assume that international and - to a greater extent - supranational institutions take bits of sovereignty away from nation-states. This cession of sovereignty, the assumption posits, implies greater cooperation, increased harmony of interests, and decreased conflict. The EU is thus identified as the emblem of this process. Often firm in its “European exceptionalism” especially in contrast with its partner on the other side of the Atlantic, the EU has expressed its positions in terms of diplomacy, human rights, and international cooperation even during the peak of the so-called “war on terror”. Scholars and political actors have portrayed the EU as a “global norms setter” and a stronger, increasingly unified voice in the international arena calling for more humanitarian principles.

Thus, with the entry into force of the Amsterdam treaty in 1999 and the change of policy venue, expectations were high for a translation of that institutional change into a more humanitarian, human rights-centered implementation. Primary responsibility for asylum policy was going to gradually shift away from Member States and national justice and interior ministries to common institutions, mainly the European Commission and Parliament. According to the previously stated assumption, this shift should have translated into a focus less on national sovereignty, security, and control, and more on cooperation and solidarity (Maurer et al., 2007). Nevertheless, overall stability prevailed and a major shift in asylum policy implementation failed to materialize (ibidem). This was mainly due to two factors. First, institutional change, or change in policy venue, occurred gradually and slowly, and is still underway. The Dublin regulation remained the prevailing principle for assigning responsibility and burden sharing, determining the EU Member State responsible to examine asylum applications seeking protection under the Geneva convention largely as the state of first entry, which left policy implementation mainly in the hands of national actors and agencies. Second, there was a lack of mobilization and entrepreneurship to shift the image and discourse in substantial ways, and selective attention and bounded rationality ensured overall continuity in European asylum policy. Despite the general policy stability, small incremental changes were introduced. For example, at the normative level the principle of solidarity was put forward which permitted the development of common policies and agencies without dramatically disrupting the apparent equilibrium. Specifically, in its most recent formulation in Art. 80 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union - commonly referred to as the treaty of Lisbon - the principle of solidarity establishes that all possible measures should be taken by Member States in order to have an equal share of responsibilities concerning asylum. Solidarity can be conceived as composed of four interrelated dimensions:

• Normative solidarity and the harmonization of asylum and refugee legislation (for example, with the Directive for Reception Conditions) 
• Financial solidarity and redistribution of funds to Member States coping with larger number of asylum seekers (for example, with the European Refugee Fund) 
• Operational or technical solidarity with EU personnel support of Member States implementation of common asylum law (for example, with the European Asylum Support Office) 
• Physical solidarity and the actual relocation of asylum seekers and refugees, still scarcely implemented to date. 

The practice of policy harmonization has been slow and characterized by both advancements and setbacks led by institutions and issue salience (Givens & Luedtke, 2004). The introduction of the principle of solidarity and its uneasy cohabitation with the Dublin system, together with the push from transnational actors and activists for more inclusive and humanitarian policies, underlied a long period of precarious policy equilibrium.

Figure 1 Source: UNHCR, Frontex, Council of the EuropeanUnion 

The critical event that disrupted the long stability in the asylum policy subsystem came with the uptick in asylum applications and inflow of refugees in 2015 following the civil conflict in Syria. In reality, the numbers were much smaller relative to Syria’s neighboring countries. For example, according to UN data (which underestimates the actual number of Syrians by not accounting for irregular entries, especially in neighbouring countries), Syrian asylum applications in the whole EU in the period 2011-2016 were slightly over one million over a total population of over 510 million people. In comparison, Lebanon had a similar number of registered refugees, though its total population is smaller than 6 million, and its economic resources and strength fall greatly behind the highly developed European states. Many analysts have pointed out the potential for integration of refugees into developed economies and societies with ageing populations. The discourse of crisis remains in 2017, despite declining numbers of incoming migrants and refugees, as Figure 1 shows.

Nevertheless, the media and political leaders at the national and EU levels portrayed the issue as an existential crisis. At the grassroots level, people responded and amplified the narrative, shifting public opinion and contributing to the social construction of crisis which went both top-down, from elites and the media, and bottom-up, increased by the public opinion (Cross, 2017). Once on the agenda, a policy problem perceived as a crisis provides a critical juncture, an opportunity for decisions to be taken quickly and often without broad consultation and debate. It gives a sense of urgency and prevailing exigency. As in many other EU perceived existential crises (i.e. the Eurozone crisis), there is a tension between potential setbacks in the EU integration process, with centrifugal forces and a comeback of national politics. Nevertheless, it has been observed how crises actually provide a common platform for stronger common action and more resolute integration. Similarly in this case, it has been argued that the addition of layers of common agencies and policies in response to the refugee crisis had limited effectiveness and efficiency, overburdening some Member States and potentially threatening the Union (Trauner, 2016). Counter to this widespread narrative, I argue that the refugee “crisis” allowed for a shift in policy image and a cascade effect that has been leading to rapid policy change, though in unexpected directions. The EU is indeed strengthening cooperation and integrated, EU level policy designs, implementations, and agencies. Yet, the change is not advancing a more humanitarian, inclusive approach. Rather, it is pushing towards increased coordination and integration in border control and security, with increased intelligence sharing and a general militarization of interventions.